![Asim Munir was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal last year in May after Pakistan's four-day conflict with India [Handout via Inter-Services Public Relations]](https://i0.wp.com/dgrnews.com.ng/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1788510875869.jpg?fit=720%2C804&ssl=1)
Pakistan has begun one of the most significant changes to its military command system in decades, replacing a long-standing coordination arrangement between the army, navy and air force with a new structure that gives the Chief of Defence Forces, CDF, direct operational authority over the country’s armed forces.
The restructuring was given a statutory foundation in late August after Pakistan’s parliament approved two pieces of legislation defining the powers of the new military office. The National Assembly passed the Defence Forces of Pakistan Act, 2026, and an amendment to the National Command Authority Act, 2010, on August 20.
The legislation follows the 27th constitutional amendment adopted in November last year, which created the CDF position. The latest laws formally establish the authority and command responsibilities attached to the office.
The changes come slightly more than a year after Pakistan and India fought a four-day conflict in May 2025 and represent the biggest restructuring of Pakistan’s senior military command since 1976.
That was the year the country created the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, CJCSC, primarily as a coordinating position among the three military services. That office has now been abolished and replaced by a Defence Forces Headquarters, DFHQ, headed by the CDF.
Field Marshal Asim Munir currently occupies the new position while also serving as Chief of Army Staff.
The legislation was passed unusually quickly. The bills were not originally listed on the National Assembly’s agenda, but the cabinet approved them on the morning of August 20 before lawmakers passed them within hours. The constitutional amendment that created the new command arrangement had also moved through parliament on a compressed timetable the previous November.
Pakistan’s military has historically wielded enormous influence over the country’s political system. Since independence in 1947, the military has staged four coups and governed the country directly for more than three decades. No elected prime minister has completed a full five-year term.
Against that background, the new command structure raises questions extending beyond military efficiency. It could also reshape the relationship between Pakistan’s elected civilian leadership and the armed forces, while altering the balance among the army, navy and air force.
From Coordination to Direct Command
The most important distinction between the old CJCSC system and the new CDF structure concerns the authority attached to the top military office.
The CJCSC was principally designed to coordinate the three services. The chairman did not possess direct command authority over the navy or air force, while each service retained substantial control over its own operations and institutional affairs.
The new legislation changes that arrangement by granting the CDF “operational command and control of the Armed Forces”.
That means the CDF is responsible to the federal government for military operations across the army, navy and air force rather than exercising authority principally within the army.
A retired three-star general based in Rawalpindi described the new arrangement as the first time Pakistan has established a genuinely codified chain of command of this kind. Under the structure he described, authority runs from the prime minister to the CDF and the new Defence Forces Headquarters, then to the individual service chiefs and ultimately to formations operating on the ground.
“The CJCSC never had that kind of codified, statutory operational grip,” the retired general said.
Retired three-star general and former defence secretary Naeem Khalid Lodhi similarly argued that the legislation transforms the position from a coordinating office into a genuine command post.
“Any command is ineffective if the commander cannot incentivise or disincentivise,” Lodhi said. “The Commander of the Defence Forces is now a real commander, and that has been properly formalised through this legislation.”
Under the former system, he explained, the office did not have arrangements allowing its holder to take action concerning the navy or air force. That limitation has now been removed under the new structure.
Karachi-based lawyer Abdul Moiz Jaferii offered a different assessment of the old system, arguing that the CJCSC had already become largely symbolic in practice because of the army’s dominant position within the military hierarchy.
“In practice, this became a ceremonial position with little more than post office authority due to the hegemony of the army within the hierarchy,” Jaferii said.
Why the Army’s Dominance Is a Concern
Although the CDF system gives the top military office authority over all three services, the new structure has generated questions about whether the army will become even more dominant.
One of the most consequential provisions concerns the Commander of the National Strategic Command, CNSC, the position responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear-capable forces.
The new arrangement requires the CNSC to come from the army and provides that the appointment is made on the recommendation of the CDF.
General Syed Aamer Raza became the first CNSC in July 2026. He was promoted from lieutenant general to take up the position after previously serving as Chief of General Staff.
Unlike the former CJCSC position, which could theoretically be occupied by an officer from the army, navy or air force, the CNSC position is now reserved for an army officer.
Lahore-based strategic analyst Majid Nizami said the change effectively closes a route through which a senior naval or air force officer could potentially occupy the top strategic command position.
The previous CJCSC position had been theoretically open to all three services, although the practical history of the post was already heavily weighted toward the army. The last non-army officer to occupy the position was Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroze Khan, who left the post in 1997.
The new arrangement therefore has analysts questioning whether the institutional balance among the services will be affected.
The retired Rawalpindi-based general described the new command structure as unmistakably army-centric.
A former senior military official who worked in strategic planning also warned that the concentration of authority could eventually affect the institutional identity of the navy and air force.
Under the new arrangement, he said, senior positions across the three services would be approved by the CDF. Having promotions decided by an officer outside an individual service could create resentment and gradually weaken the separate institutional identities of the navy and air force.
Concerns Over the Navy’s Strategic Role
The implications may be particularly significant for Pakistan’s navy because of the country’s sea-based deterrence capabilities.
Retired Vice Admiral Ahmed Saeed argued that naval strategic responsibilities require highly specialised technical understanding, particularly in areas involving communications at sea and submerged, surface and air platforms.
Saeed, a former president of the National Institute of Maritime Affairs in Islamabad, said the central issue was not simply whether the services would remain under unified command.
Instead, he identified two important questions: how proportionately the three services would be represented in the decision-making process at CDF headquarters and how much operational authority individual service chiefs would retain at the highest level.
“The risk isn’t dilution of control,” Saeed said. “It’s that assurance and survivability arguments get subordinated to a land-centric concept of deterrence.”
Lodhi acknowledged the concern but said possible safeguards could still emerge through the rules governing the new system.
He said he had previously proposed that the officer responsible for strategic forces should rotate among the three services instead of remaining permanently with the army. He also suggested that senior officers from the three services could be identified as possible future candidates for the CDF position.
Such arrangements, he suggested, could still be introduced through rules of business that have yet to be finalised.
Those rules could potentially require the CDF to act on recommendations from the relevant naval or air force chief in areas falling specifically within those services.
Changes to Nuclear and Missile Command
The restructuring also affects the architecture surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command.
The CDF is expected to serve as deputy chairman of the National Command Authority, NCA, which oversees the country’s nuclear weapons and is chaired by the prime minister.
The changes also include a distinction between conventional missile operations and the country’s nuclear deterrence structure.
Pakistan established the Army Rocket Force Command last year to handle conventional missile strikes outside the nuclear chain of command.
According to one Islamabad-based defence analyst, the arrangement creates a clearer distinction between strategic deterrence and conventional missile operations, which had previously occupied a more ambiguous space.
The Strategic Plans Division, SPD, is also expected to continue its established role in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes.
Rather than being absorbed into the new command, the SPD is expected to operate under the new CNSC appointment.
The SPD has managed Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes for more than two decades.
Formal authority over Pakistan’s nuclear forces is expected to remain with the prime minister. However, the strategic planning official said the CDF could have substantial influence over nuclear decision-making in practice.
That distinction between formal civilian authority and practical military influence is central to the broader debate surrounding the command restructuring.
What It Means for Civilian Control
The most politically sensitive question raised by the new system is whether it strengthens military effectiveness at the expense of civilian oversight.
Pakistan’s military already occupies a powerful position in the country’s political history. Four military coups and more than three decades of direct military rule have made the relationship between elected governments and the armed forces a persistent issue.
The new legislation does not simply create another coordinating office. It establishes a statutory command position with operational authority over the entire armed forces.
Colonel Inam Raheim, a former army officer who is now a lawyer, argues that the change shifts significant authority away from elected civilians.
That criticism focuses on the practical consequences of concentrating military command under the CDF. Although the CDF remains formally responsible to the federal government, the expanded authority of the office could give the military leadership greater institutional influence over defence operations and strategic decision-making.
The distinction is particularly important because the CDF is currently held by the serving army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. The same individual therefore occupies the country’s army leadership and the newly created position with operational command across the armed forces.
The restructuring consequently creates a command architecture in which the army chief also sits at the centre of the wider military hierarchy.
A Five-Decade Break With the Previous System
Pakistan’s new military structure represents a decisive departure from the framework established in 1976.
For roughly five decades, the CJCSC existed primarily to coordinate the army, navy and air force without possessing the direct operational authority now assigned to the CDF.
The new legislation changes that principle by placing the three services within a unified operational command headed by a single commander.
Supporters of the restructuring see the arrangement as a way of creating a clearer chain of command and eliminating weaknesses associated with a largely coordinating post.
Critics, however, are concerned about what happens when unified command is combined with the army’s existing institutional dominance.
The question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan now has a more efficient military command system. It is also whether the new structure can maintain meaningful representation for the navy and air force, preserve their professional identities and ensure that civilian authorities retain effective oversight of military power.
With the CJCSC abolished, the Defence Forces Headquarters now stands at the centre of Pakistan’s military command structure. The CDF has operational authority over all three services, while the army retains a particularly prominent role in strategic command.
The full consequences will depend partly on the rules still being developed to govern how the new headquarters operates and how the service chiefs interact with the CDF.
For Pakistan, the restructuring marks the most substantial change to its higher military command in five decades. It formalises authority that analysts say the army chief has often exercised informally and creates a new chain of command whose effects will extend beyond battlefield operations into the country’s broader civil-military balance.
