Why Modi’s Israel Visit Raises Strategic Concerns for Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan — When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Tel Aviv this week for his second official visit to Israel, the optics went far beyond diplomacy. It marked a deepening strategic alignment between New Delhi and Tel Aviv at a time of intense regional polarisation — and one that Pakistani analysts say could alter South Asia’s security equation.
Modi was welcomed with full state honours by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, underscoring the resilience of India–Israel ties despite Israel’s growing international isolation over its war in Gaza and ongoing legal scrutiny at the International Criminal Court.
For Pakistan, the visit is not merely symbolic. It reinforces a military, intelligence, and technological partnership that Islamabad has long viewed with unease.
A rapidly deepening India–Israel partnership
Since Modi’s first historic visit to Israel in 2017 — the first by an Indian prime minister — bilateral cooperation has expanded at unprecedented speed. India has become Israel’s largest arms customer, while cooperation now extends into artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, surveillance systems, missile defence and emerging military technologies.
According to defence analysts, discussions during this visit include:
- Expanded access to Israeli military hardware previously restricted for export
- Joint development and local production of missile defence systems
- Collaboration on next-generation technologies such as quantum computing and AI-enabled warfare
One system reportedly under discussion is Iron Beam, Israel’s high-energy laser air-defence platform, alongside deeper technology-sharing around the Iron Dome missile defence system.
For Pakistan, these developments matter because they directly enhance India’s conventional and asymmetric military capabilities — particularly along contested borders.
Netanyahu’s “hexagon of alliances” and Pakistan’s place in it
Days before Modi’s arrival, Netanyahu outlined what he called a “hexagon of alliances” — a loose strategic framework involving India, Greece, Cyprus and select partners across Asia, Africa and the Arab world. Its stated goal is to counter what Israel describes as hostile ideological blocs in the region.
Analysts believe the framework implicitly targets states and movements critical of Israel and aligned with Sunni-majority powers such as Türkiye and Saudi Arabia — both of which maintain close defence ties with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s relevance in this context is amplified by two factors:
- Its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed in 2025
- Its status as the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons, a long-standing Israeli security concern
Historically, Israel viewed Pakistan’s nuclear capability with alarm. In the 1980s, Tel Aviv even explored — unsuccessfully — the idea of coordinating with India against Pakistani nuclear facilities.
Intelligence cooperation: a quiet but serious concern
Beyond weapons sales, Pakistani officials point to deep-rooted intelligence cooperation between India and Israel. Links between India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Israel’s Mossad date back decades and have reportedly intensified in recent years.
This intelligence convergence worries Islamabad for three reasons:
- Enhanced surveillance and cyber capabilities against Pakistan
- Expanded intelligence-sharing during crises or military escalations
- The possibility of coordinated diplomatic pressure portraying Pakistan as a security threat
Some analysts argue that Pakistan may not be an explicit target of Israel’s new strategic framing, but rather an indirect casualty of converging Indian, Israeli and Western threat narratives.
Lessons from the 2025 India–Pakistan escalation
Pakistan’s concerns are grounded in recent experience. During the May 2025 India–Pakistan crisis — which escalated into a brief but intense four-day aerial confrontation — India deployed Israeli-origin drones and surveillance systems.
Pakistani analysts argue that Israeli military technology has already shifted the tactical balance in India’s favour, making further cooperation a direct security issue rather than a theoretical risk.
The Gulf dilemma for Islamabad
Perhaps the most delicate fallout of the India–Israel partnership lies in the Gulf.
Pakistan relies heavily on Gulf states for:
- Financial assistance and loan rollovers
- Energy security
- Worker remittances that sustain its economy
While Saudi Arabia remains a close strategic partner, the United Arab Emirates — one of Pakistan’s key allies — signed a strategic agreement with India in early 2026. This places Islamabad in a balancing act between competing regional partnerships.
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to strengthen ties with Türkiye, Iran, Central Asia and Russia, promoting what officials describe as a “geoeconomic” approach rooted in trade and connectivity rather than military blocs.
A shifting regional chessboard
India and Israel increasingly frame their security doctrines around combating what they describe as “Islamic radicalism”, a narrative New Delhi has repeatedly used to justify accusations against Pakistan.
Yet Pakistani strategists argue that Islamabad is not without leverage. They point to:
- Pakistan’s military response during the 2025 crisis
- Renewed diplomatic engagement with the United States
- Its growing role as a regional mediator amid tensions involving Iran
Rather than immediate confrontation, analysts say Pakistan’s challenge will be managing perception, alliances and deterrence in a landscape where India–Israel cooperation is becoming institutionalised.
Modi’s Israel visit matters for Pakistan because it cements a partnership that strengthens India militarily, deepens intelligence coordination against perceived threats, and reshapes regional alliances in ways that could marginalise Islamabad if left unaddressed.
While no immediate escalation is inevitable, the visit underscores a long-term strategic reality: Pakistan must navigate a more tightly aligned India–Israel axis while carefully balancing its relationships across the Middle East, South Asia and beyond.